The War on Drugs as Make-Work

An argument for ending the War on Drugs is that it would undermine the drug gangs. At the moment we have a baptists and bootleggers situation, where the drug ban benefits illegal providers, because it raises the price of drugs a lot. If drugs were legal, supply would increase a lot, lowering prices. Criminal gangs don’t actually have a comparative advantage at running efficient supply chains – if they did they would be running WalMart instead – so they will be out-competed by new, legal entrants to the market. This would dramatically reduce their revenues, making joining them less attractive, and leave them with less money to spend on sinful things.

And all of this is probably true. But…

Here’s another way of looking at it. At the moment some argue the US has a zero-marginal-product-worker problem; there are people who aren’t worth hiring at any price, because you can’t trust them not to steal from you, or break things, or insult customers, or get you into legal trouble. But, like the army before them, criminal gangs can make use of such people – perhaps because criminal gangs can make use of extra-legal motivational techniques. Normally, this would be bad, if criminal gangs were hiring such people to do immoral things like theft. But at present many of them are usefully employed in the socially productive activity of consumer product distribution.

And another group of thugs, who lack skills beyond the ability to yell loudly and order people around, get make-work as DEA agents.

So actually the War on Drugs is job security for semi-criminal ZMP workers, providing them with employment and protecting them from competition. Maybe pretty rubbish protection – it leaves many of them dead or imprisoned – but other forms of ‘protection’ for low-skilled workers also have some pretty negative consequences.

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What if Regulation was a Finite Resource?

Alternative Title: Conservation of Regulation

Think of the fuels that have provided the energy for human civilization so far – coal, oil, gas. They existed for thousands of years, largely inert. A small part of them (mainly coal) was used by humans for forges and the like. But then we discovered them during the industrial revolution. We put them to good use, but there’s only a limited supply.

What if regulation was the same? There’s only a finite amount available. For most of history, this existed in a largely inert fashion, regulating the atmosphere, evolution, and so on. A small part of it was used by humans to regulate their habits and bowl movements.

But then during the industrial revolution regulation was discovered by socialists and paternalists. They started using it on a massive scale, trying to regulate all of society.

Unfortunately, there’s only a finite amount of regulation available. We’ve been using so much over the last few hundred years that there’s not enough to regulate the climate – hence climate change. It caused a breakdown in virtue when people’s ability to regulate their habits was reduced. It also caused the obesity crisis because we can no longer regulate our bowl movements properly.

Now, leading scientists are warning about an even greater threat: we might be using up so much regulation that the earth’s orbit will cease to be regular. This will have dramatic consequences, ranging from disruptions to the seasons and day-and-night cycle, to the earth crashing into the sun.

Leading scientists say we need to rapidly reduce our regulation consumption if this is to be avoided. They recommend bring our regulation uses back down to 1990s levels by 2020, and 1900 levels by 2050, and 1700 levels by 2100. Unfortunately, it may already be too late to avoid changing the day-and-night cycle by 1-2 hours, in an effect scientists have dubbed ‘daylight savings time’.

Economists are divided on the best way to respond to the crisis. Some favor a regulation tax, where anyone who implemented or enforced a regulation would have to pay a tax equal to the negative externality they caused. Others suggest a cap-and-trade system, whereby rich countries would be able to buy regulation credits from poor countries. Some politicians prefer a command-and-control approach, where they would pass regulations limiting the use of regulations in industry.

Some progress has been made – most countries have signed up to the Hong Kong Protocol, promising to reduce their regulation levels. The US risks becoming an international pariah by refusing to sign; the Obama administration defended its intransigence:

Hong Kong is, in many ways, unrealistic. Many states do not want to meet their Hong Kong targets. The targets themselves were arbitrary and not based upon political science. For America, complying with those mandates would have a positive economic impact, with increased hiring by small businesses and price decreases for consumers. And when you evaluate all these flaws, most reasonable people will understand that it’s not sound public policy.

But you too can make a difference! There are many easy steps you can take. Maybe turn off your thermostat – doesn’t the earth need that regulation more than your central heating? Write to politicians expressing your concern. Join a local libertarian group.

Remember, preventing the world crashing into the sun is more important than regulating your heartbeat, so ask yourself: do I really need a pace-maker?

How not to reform the insurance industry

Browsing the comments on Scott’s blog recently, I came across an interesting suggestion for reforming the insurance industry.

If I were declared supreme fascist dictator of the world (which would be GOOD for the world), I’d decree that insurance companies had some specific fixed amount of time to investigate a client and return the premiums not consumed by that investigation. After that, unless they could prove deliberate fraud they were on the hook for their contract.

– William O. B’Livion

However, this is probably a pretty bad idea.

At the moment insurance companies only need to investigate clients who make a claim. If enacted, this would require insurance companies to investigate at length everyone who took out a policy.  As such, investigation costs would be much higher, requiring higher premiums for everyone.

Additionally, at the moment there is an implicit punishment for attempting to cheat an insurance company: you pay the premiums, but then don’t get the payout, so the premiums paid act like a fine for your attempted fraud. If insurance companies had to investigate at the very beginning instead, people would have more incentive to try to defraud insurance companies, as there would be less cost. As such, both fraud and anti-fraud costs would rise, both of which require an increase in premiums for everyone.

Finally, at the moment these foregone premiums go to the insurance company. As the insurance market is pretty competitive, this money ultimately results in lower premiums for honest customers. Requiring insurance companies to investigate immediately would take away this cross-subsidy and again raise premiums for everyone.

So it turns out that, like most such suggestions involving restricting people’s ability to freely sign contracts without any clear market failure identified, the proposal is a bad idea. Perhaps this might be a popular policy, if people somehow ignore the costs, or assume they’re being paid by evil corporations. Indeed, this might even be popular with incumbent insurance companies, if the high upfront costs of investigation it would require act as a barrier to entry and protect them from competition. As usual, ultimately the consumer pays. But it’s interesting how, in exploring why it’s a bad idea, we come to appreciate more the virtues of the current system.